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Abstract 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a post-conflict society, is in the process of developing and 
reconstructing its public-administrative institutions. The inherent part of this agenda is 
issue of establishment of an anti-corruption office, with so far an undefined mandate or 
required legal framework.  Corruption as a real and documented phenomenon and 
requires an adequate institutional response, such as the reconstruction of the judicial-
police system, but it also requires a central office that would deal continuously, 
specifically and in an organised way with corruption cases. In devising a proper 
institutional response to corruption, we have take account here of the fact that BH has 
undergone recently mass destruction and a grave loss of inter-segmentary trust, and such 
disposition stimulates corruption practices. In such circumstances, a formalistic and loose 
approach to the issue of an anti-corruption body might not be affordable in case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. We argue instead here for the institutionalisation of a “strong” anti-
corruption body. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The scope and purpose of this research is to explore the necessity and feasibility of an 
independent and specialized anti-corruption body in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the 
purpose of familiarizing the reader to the so far achieved goals in endeavours of BH 
Government to fight corruption, we shall provide a disclosure of the given effort and 
results, while prior to that we will feature some aspects of post-conflict development of 
BH society, as critical for understanding of the necessity for an central anti-corruption 
body conceptualized in an optimal manner.  
After this, the paper will conduct an informative-comparative overview of 
anticorruption agencies elsewhere; feature their successfulness and the necessary 
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preconditions for that success, as well as modus operandi and status of those agencies. By 
reviewing major preconditions for functioning of these bodies, we should be able to 
design relevant question for two interview groups that will be examined in the ensuing 
course of the research. Those are namely state parliamentarians and leading officers’ of 
the agencies that are included in activities related to implementation of BHs 
Anticorruption Strategy, as well as members of the Working group in charged to provide 
a draft of the Law against Corruption.  
The major hypothesis of this research is that primary law-enforcement institutions 
alone are not capable of nurturing flawed BH society, from such a serious plague as 
corruption. The suggested reason for this is that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a post-
conflict society, where there never was a clear break with the corrupt practices of the war 
ethno-elites, either through the declared and witnessed commitment of some new political 
wave or through technical systematic processes such as lustration, which was so far 
practiced selectively by the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not to 
mention delicacy of the states arrangement where it is difficult to follow the lines of 
responsibility, which often blurs in dysfunctional administrative-jurisdictional alignment, 
or disappears in the Bermuda triangle of implicit/explicit ethno-political interpretations of 
national interests.  
It is therefore important to understand that corruption, even taken without clear 
indicators of its scope and impact (e.g. incompatibility of media coverage and real 
judicial-penal proceedings activated, or positively ended with full fetched verdict), has a 
fertile ground in BH, which is due to lack of accountability mechanism developed in 
advanced democracies. This assumption provides the basis to ask about the feasibility of 
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an independent and specialized anti-corruption agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a 
wide spectrum of powers, including an investigative and preventory mandate. Thereafter 
three mayor questions occur in subsequent order, which we will discuss in this research, 
namely: (1) does BH needs such an agency; (2) is there political will on the state level to 
give impetus to the law, that will push forward this idea and (3) what is disposition of the 
judicial-professional core in BH on this matter. 
 The overall frame of the research is the assertion that BH, as a post-conflict 
society, is particularly sensitive to organized and systematic corruption, whose centre of 
gravity is in the public-political-administrative sector. In those circumstances, 
disorganized and uncoordinated work of other state institutions that directly or indirectly 
deal with corruption, cannot answer post-conflict residuum’s, such as dysfunctional 
administrative organisation and unhindered persistence of the same political elites that 
have induced and participated in the last war in BH. Since war, by its definition, reflects 
unlawful, chaotic, asocial values, it is likely to assume that criminal practices would 
persist even among war elites, and that these practices or networks would persist in the 
post-conflict development, which is another detrimental factor to the transition of the war 
torned societies into peaceful and democratic ones.  In those circumstances, it is 
important to ask what role a strong anti-corruption body can play in remedying 
malfeasances inherited from the recent tumultuous past of BH society. Although there are 
different types of anti-corruption agencies in the world, with different roles assigned to 
them, we shall argue here for the necessity of a “strongly” conceptualized body: 
specialized, with high investigative powers, level of independence and strong status 
(initiative and coordination; that can approach any information relevant to inquiry of the 
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corruption cases, held by any other institution or private person) in the network of other 
state agencies that encounter and deal with corruption cases, especially those gravest 
ones. 
  
OVERALL RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
The Post-conflict peculiarities of BH society 
 
Unavoidably relevant to this research is the question of feasibility of anticorruption 
bodies in post-conflict societies, where overall social stability could be at stake due to 
corrupt practices of ruling groups. The overall assumption is that corruption in divided 
societies, such as BH, can be defeated only through powerful institutions, which would 
have capacities to implement adequate domestic and international legal regulations. 
Capable anticorruption agency can prevent reversible streaming1 and a “state capture”2 
phenomenon. Considering formerly alleged social stabilization role of anti-corruption 
                                                 
1
 Ackerman S. (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge University Press; 
Working Paper, pp. 131: “A recent study suggests that a high level of ethnic fragmentation makes it difficult to 
establish a functioning, competent government (Easterly and Levine 197), but a state can overcome the disadvantages 
of ethnic divisions by establishing strong, corruption free government institutions. Where ethnic divisions have not 
been well handled, as in Nigeria, the result can be a state focused on sharing the spoils; not promoting overall 
prosperity…Divisions can be so severe that government can aim for no more than the avoidance of civil war. 
2
 An Overview of Corruption in Central and Easter Europe, given by UNDP March 2002 provides 
following definition of the state capture phenomena: “State capture, in contrast, refers to the illicit actions 
of both private sector and public sector actors in actually shaping the “formation” of the basic rules of the 
game through the illicit and non-transparent provision of payments or other benefits to public officials. It 
describes activities on the part of enterprises and individuals to purchase preferential advantages directly 
from the state by subverting the formation of laws, rules, regulations and decrees. It includes not only the 
behavior of influential oligarchs who buy off legislators, but also the behavior of political leaders who 
shape the legal and regulatory framework to ensure their own private control over key resources. In each 
case, the state is captured to serve private interests and in each case, state capture encodes preferential 
advantages in the very rules of the game.” 
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body, it is worth analyzing its importance and feasibility with a view of possible 
influence on the experts and political actors concerned with this issue.  
 The post-conflict peculiarity of BH society is a fact that needs to be taken into 
account if one wishes to deal with the phenomenon of corruption in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which has its strong social implications, which are largely determined by 
the recent violent past and immediate and long term effects that the past has produced. 
The immediate effects, such as collapse of governmental infrastructure and massive 
destructions, might not be as relevant to this research as, on the other side, some of the 
long term effects that affect the social fabric, such as collapse of inter-segmentary trust 
and binding values. These later issues greatly affect BHs corruption agenda. One of the 
effects of such a climate that requires attention is politization of corruption, as a direct 
consequence of the recent conflict-induced ethno-political fragmentation, which results in 
diluted social and public responsibility.  
 In many cases ethno-political loyalty is useful for the assessment of public 
behaviour, and is social frame of thinking that is often used to rationalize or relativise 
corruption cases against interests of the political elites3. The lack of responsibility arising 
therefrom emerges from the intentional identification of the political parties with ethnic 
groups. A politicized conception of ethnicity might be seen as an obstacle in assertion of 
civil responsibility toward state, since, due to recent historic circumstances, 
administrative functions in BH have been directly deduced from ruling political layers 
distributed along ethnic lines. Another peculiarity is an extremely fragmented 
                                                 
3
 Transparency Internationals Global Corruption Barometer for 2004 shows that BHs political parties corruption index 
rates highest in relation to other States institutions and sectors, which might be related to ethno-political fragmentation of 
BHs society. 
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administrative organization, which renders difficult the control of corruption in public 
sector.  
 During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the collapse of institutions and 
absence of any regulations have created fertile ground for the wide development of  
organized crime along different levels of the hierarchical structures of the involved ruling 
ethno elites. The conclusion of the war was brought in the form of legitimization of 
political subjectivity of the engaged ethno-political parties, which paradoxically meant, at 
the time being, a legitimization of the criminal activities directly or indirectly related to 
ruling ethno-national elites. There was no all-encompassing lustration process, given the 
fact that conclusion of the war and ensued process of peace building were both consigned 
to the same those elites, some of whose members have earned during the war and 
immediately after a considerable criminal history. This acceptance and legitimization of 
the involved ethno parties is a price of the peace, and it relates to a type of the post-
conflict policy delivered by the international community in a given context.4 On top of it, 
the latest reports given by leading international agencies dealing with corruption, suggest 
that corruption is a growing phenomena in the world as well as in BH, whose effects 
largely induce poverty, distrust in state institutions and affects overall instability of the 
social system.5  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Global Corruption Report, 2005: Special feature – Corruption in post-conflict reconstruction: “The international 
community may wisely let corruption buy a temporary peace when the risk of renewed conflict is too high. The legacy 
of such an approach is risky…“. – Absence of the lustration process implies that the same international policy has been 
applied immediately after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
5
 Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report 2005, shows that corruption undermines economic 
development and threatens reconstruction of the countries that are exiting war or other crisis situations. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has slipped down from 73 to 83 place on the TIs global list of corruption, which is strikingly bad for the 
image of the county and attracting of foreign investments, and goes along discouraging thesis about the corruptions 
growth in this Country. 
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Contextualizing the question of an anti-corruption body within current state anti-
corruption efforts 
 
An important factor of anti-corruption struggle represents the establishment of adequate 
institutions that would be supported by adequate laws and regulations. 6Although in BH 
during last couple of years, a lot had been done in the filed of judicial reform, both at the 
state and entities levels, and considering ongoing activities in the area of police reform 
(though this proved to be an extremely cumbersome process), still anti-corruption 
strategy remains to be dealt with collaterally, in the shadow of the reconstruction of the 
primary police-judicial institutions.  
The OHR (Office of the High Representative) in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
launched its Anti Corruption Unit in 1999 under the auspices of its Economic 
Department, followed by several subsequent reform measures in the area of judiciary, 
penal legislation system both on Entities and State level, as well as the establishment of 
the State Prosecution Office. The latter had filed a several complaints and launched 
investigations against ex high-level officials of the political parties. Such a practice 
should suggest that this problem has begun to unfold and that permanent solution in the 
form of repressive measures of international community in BH would bring this issue of 
political-administrative corruption close to an end. On the other hand, there still remains 
                                                 
6
 The Need for, and Role of, an Independent Anti-Corruption Agency, Prepared by Jeremy Pope for Transparency 
International (TI): “As the corrupt grow more sophisticated, conventional law enforcement agencies are becoming less 
able to detect and prosecute complex corruption cases. Furthermore, in a system in which corruption is endemic, 
conventional law enforcement mechanisms may themselves harbor corrupt officials and they will tend to lack the 
sophistication and expertise essential to the task. In recent years, governments have sought to bolster detection efforts 
by introducing independent Anti-Corruption Agencies or Commissions. Given that prevention is always better than 
prosecution, a small investigative and monitoring unit with appropriate authority and independence from politicians 
(where much of the problem can lie) may be much better placed to ensure that effective preventive steps are identified 
and taken. “ 
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legitimate question about sustainability of such a system, where temporary repressive 
actions of the OHR or foreign prosecutors do not guarantee the durability of positive 
practice once the BH government assumes complete responsibility, which is inevitable if 
BH should eventually enter European integrations.   
The fact is that the OHR, as a prominent institution in the fight against corruption, 
although endowed with Bonn powers, which were am piously used in the past, either in 
the sense of imposition of the laws and regulations or dismissal of the political 
functionaries, still remains out of the governmental system, although having all 
precedence and prerogatives. There are no guarantees that administrative-political 
persons, who have been involved in criminal activities in the war and after-war period, 
would not venture to assume governmental functions in the future and misuse their 
position for personal benefit.7 In the light of OHRs intention to fight corruption problem 
in BH, there have been undertaken serious institutional and legislative measures, whose 
function is indirectly related to the issue of corruption: we are talking about establishment 
of primary institutions at the state level Ministry of Security (including State Boarder 
Service and State Police), ongoing reform of the police, conducted reform of the penal 
legislation system and ongoing efforts in creating lex specialis against corruption.  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, then years after Dayton Peace Agreement still has no anti-corruption 
law,  which is often criticized by the media, who warn about consequences of the vacuum 
                                                 
7
 This can be supported by the Study of the General Accounting Office, research organisation of the 
American Congress which had issued a special Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina at the request of 
Benjamin A. Gilman, president of the Committee for International Relations of the USA Congress, and his 
members Sam Gejdenson i Douglas K. Bereuter, in 2000, titled: “Criminal and Corruption Threatens 
Successful Implementation of the Dayton Agreement”. According to this study, corruption blocks progress 
in implementation of Dayton Agreement. This report paid special attention to the missing of hundreds of 
millions of dollars of the International money intended for reconstruction and development and 
irregularities of the privatisation process: Independent magazine “Dani”, July 14, 2000. 
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in this part of codification, and very often reflect sceptical in terms of applicability of 
crucial BHs Laws.8  
 For the time being, there are some hints that the state level Working Group9 for 
fight against corruption would recommend establishing an anti-corruption Office that 
would coordinate activities of the various actors like financial police, customs, 
prosecutors offices etc. and it would be situated under auspices of the Ministry of 
Security, where investigative activities would be led by the separate branch within SIPA 
(State Information and Protection Agency). On the other side, an imperative for having 
effective anti-corruption body understands centralized data basis, high investigative 
powers and its complete depolitisation. Therefore, it is justifiable to ask if any of those 
conditions could be answered by the Working Group’s proposal of a loose “coordination” 
body, in particularly because there are some practical examples, which shows importance 
of an independent and empowered central anti-corruption body.10  
                                                 
8
 Free lance journalist Nidzara Ahmetasevic, in  the article “Bosnia opposition urges anticorruption law”, 
published in the Anti-corruption Gateway For Europe and Asia – April 2005,  warns: “Bosnian opposition 
parties are angry that the internationally appointed authority in the country has refused to support what they 
say is a crucial law aimed at cutting down corruption, tax evasion and money laundering.  
They say the lack of legal provisions enabling courts to seize illegally acquired property and other assets is 
costing the state millions of euro in lost money. Although they presented a draft law on the seizure of 
illegally obtained assets almost 18 months ago, the ruling nationalist parties have refused to adopt it and the 
office of the High Representative (OHR) under Paddy Ashdown, has also held aloof.  
 
9
 On 14 February 2002, the BiH Council of Ministers formally established a Working Group for the Fight Against 
Corruption and Organized Crime. The Working Group’s task was to work on the preparation of a strategy to fight 
corruption and organized crime in BiH. It is composed of representatives of the BiH Council of Ministers, Interpol, of 
competent entity ministries, and of representatives of the judiciary and the police from both the BiH entities and the 
District of Brcko. 
10
 Ackerman S. (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge University Press; 
Working Paper, pp. 159: “Often prosecutors ignore corruption and focus on less politically sensitive issues. One 
response is creation of independent anticorruption commissions or inspector generals reporting only to the chief 
executive or parliament. The best known examples are provided by Hong Kong an Singapore, both city states and 
former British colonies. In both cases the turnaround in corruption combined commitment from the top, credible law 
enforcement by an independent agency operating under a strong statute, and reform of the civil service.”  
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Reasons for anti-corruption body 
 
Related to previous discussion, the question arising is how is it possible to coordinate 
anti-corruption activities with the high discretion required, when dealing with top level 
corruption. It would be rather more acceptable to have the state level body that would 
coordinate anti-corruption actions at the lower levels, but when it comes to answering top 
level corruption, things need to be concentrated and isolated at one single spot, where 
homogeneity of organization of such a body would prevent its politization.  
 There is also another argument that pushes forward the necessity for an 
independent and specialized anti-corruption body with the wide range of powers. 
Namely, the fact is that, although reformed judiciary and prosecution in BH can enhance 
procedures falling under their auspices, namely processing of given cases, prevention and 
early localization of corruptive actions cannot be enhanced without continuous effort of a 
specialized agency, which would be in position to evaluate corruption cases, patterns and 
overall trends on all territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
 Here should be also noticed a generally low rate of corruption cases of 
governmental officials, mostly due to the unprofessionally conducted preinvestigatory 
actions. Furthermore, although there have been filled a relatively high number of criminal 
reports against high ranked governmental officials, only one case in R. Srpska so far had 
been finalized with an unconfirmed court decision.11 Not to mention the fact that no 
political functionary had to step from is position due to initiated penal proceeding against 
them, and if they did so, that was due to the pressure of the OHR. Furthermore, delicacy 
of dealing with high level corruption is perceivable through the fact that no ex official has 
                                                 
11
 Transparency International: National Integrity Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina – 2004 
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been charged by domestic prosecutors, but instead by foreign prosecutors, which distrust 
the maturity of domestic judiciary, but signals, as well, a lack of self-confidence within 
those organs. The lack of this confidence relates to wider socio-political climate present 
in this Country. Therefore this climate shall be focused trough the later examination of 
the political will variable and follow up of the disclosure of what we consider as post-
conflict characteristics of BH society.  
 However, the former point implies necessity that more domestic efforts need to be 
brought about in strengthening attention and overall consensus of the political publicity in 
combating top corruption phenomena, in as much possibly effective manner. This would 
than “free” the hands of the police and judiciary organs in coping with this problem. With 
reference to what was previously said, a strong and central anti-corruption body is needed 
in the case of relative lack or presence of cross-sectoral political will to deal with the 
issues of grave corruption. In the case of the lack of the political will, it serves as a 
safeguard of social stability, while in the case of political will’s presence, it serves as an 
instrument of its implementation. So it can be viewed either or both as stabilization or 
developing factor. In either case, the very presence of such a body and public faith in it 
can positively influence at large public relation to the phenomena of high corruption and 
the “untouchables”. Though,  the paradox here arises because of the fact that initiation of 
such a body in its optimal form, at the end, is also determined by the level of political 
consensus, which would then reflect itself in the Anti-corruption Law that is to lay 
grounds to the issue of top-level anti-corruption struggle.  
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What are possible new approaches in dealing with corruption in BH? 
 
The fact is that in the past period, anticorruption approach on the state level has been 
dealt with collaterally, and not as a matter of direct concern, but now has come a time to 
put an accent on the concrete actions and inauguration of the explicit anti-corruption 
measures. Thereof, the purpose of this research aims along current efforts of BH 
government and international community to implement a state level comprehensive plan 
for the fight against corruption, by considering an explicit institutional response with 
primary regard to political corruption, in the form of empowered central anticorruption 
body. 
The main hypothesis raised thereby is that BH cannot overcome the malfeasance 
of its complex and difficult to control administrative organization, as well as lack of the 
competitive environment, which is typical for consociational12 types of democracy, solely 
by reconstructing primary police-judicial institutions. In addition, it requires a centralized 
anti-corruption agency endowed with high investigative powers, which would answer to 
the parliamentary instance of government and would have the task not only to coordinate, 
but also to launch investigative and prosecutive initiatives, and itself conducts 
investigation when a need occurs.13  A sole membership to the international initiatives, 
                                                 
12
 Democracy systems based on sharing of sovereignty among more groups. In case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina it is about constitutive peoples Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs and institutionalized forms of their 
political representation, based on parity and proportionality principles. This system is well known for the 
lack of political pluralism among participating ethnicities and constitutional impediments for 
accommodation of cross-sectoral programs and policies that are often refused through argumentation about 
protection of ethno-national interests. On top of it, a lack of political competitiveness leaves more space for 
malfeasances of ethno-political functionaries, due to lack of the control, which is in classical democracy 
systems provided by control check-competitive acting of other political parties.  
13
 Croatia is a good example as a state that shares similar historical legacy and corruption patterns related to 
complex political corruption. It had established in 2002 the USKOK (central organ for fight against 
 15 
adoption of the various laws that indirectly deal with the issue of corruption; ratified 
international treaties 14 etc. are not adequate parameters, which can assure us that grave 
corruption is being suppressed parallel with these developments, which are also subject to 
critics.15  
The complexity of BHs constitutional arrangement, ethnic borders and political 
representation, including lack of regular democratic competition and insufficient 
pluralism in the political sector, provides grounds for the hypothesis that administrative 
and political functions in BH are corruption sensitive to corruption with regard to their 
inter-ethnical allocation, which opens questions on professionalism and primarily 
independence of anti-corruption organs. Or, if we put it another way around, the 
question is how to organize anti-corruption mechanisms in a BH type of consociational 
democracy, in order to have a system which has capacity to surmount rather flexible, 
interpretable, unpredictable and often by politicians produced public discourse on 
national interests16, which can be misused to hold back processes that could lead toward 
illumination of certain illegal practices.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
corruption and organized crime), with high powers and jurisdiction over all other agencies in cases of 
organized crime and corruption. 
14
 See SPAI Progress Report on Anticorruption Efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina – April, 2004. 
15
 The Report of the Evaluationary Meeting of the Centre for Provision of the Legal Help in Fight Against 
Corruption, mentions that …as for the anti-corruption strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a part 
of the Middle term Strategy for fight against poverty, it was pointed out that large financial means have 
been spent already, without having established adequate, neither Office nor functional action plan. Further 
on, the quality of implementation is criticized as well as given dead lines and recommended measures: slow 
adoption of necessary laws, too many new commissions and sub commissions, which bring no concrete 
results, while at the same time those burden already over pressured state budget. 
16
 It is worth noticing that there is disproportion between BHs ethno-elites concern with the issue of 
national interest and actual ethnic problem indicators: According to the research of SELDI (Southeast 
European Legal Development Initiative) from 2002, corruption was seen along with unemployment, 
poverty and low incomes, as a most conspicuous problem in BH, as well in other Southeast European 
countries, while ethnic problems have been placed on the last place. See www.seldi.net 
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INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
Introduction 
 
Many countries have state bodies that deal with corruption cases, which are usually 
specialized units within primary Law enforcement agencies, such as various specialized 
departments within ministries of interior, special prosecutor offices or similar solutions, 
but the type of institution we are here interested in, which is the object of this research 
primarily represents an “independent”17, empowered and “specialized”18 anti-corruption 
body. By the example of some other states and their anti-corruption agencies, we can 
deliver a clear disclosure of the necessity of the so conceptualized body. 
Chapter 11 of the TI Source Book 2000 notes:  
 
“As the corrupt grow more sophisticated, conventional law enforcement 
agencies are becoming less able to detect and prosecute complex 
corruption cases. Furthermore, in a system in which corruption is 
endemic, conventional law enforcement mechanisms may themselves 
harbour corrupt officials. In recent years, governments have sought to 
bolster detection efforts (or at least to create the impression of their 
                                                 
17
 This term primarily suggests independence from political interference, which can be assured first of all 
through a sound and clear public-political will for such an agency, and as second, through adequate 
statutory and physical positioning of such a body in a way to be self-sufficient, in terms of designing and 
applying its policy, which means that the same should not be only a part or division within already present 
law enforcement institution, but the same has to have political backing for complete infrastructural 
independence and should answer to the top governmental instances, preferably parliament  The success of 
Hong Kong and Singapore models, which both were initiated and developed from the beginning from the 
tops level, supports here given qualification of “independence” of an anti-corruption body. 
18
 The term “specialized” stands for a body that deals only and explicitly with corruption issues; which is a 
sole matter of its concern. On the other hand, a corruption has been usually viewed as an integral part of the 
organized crime, which does not necessarily, in reality has to be so. Action matrix of institution oriented 
primarily toward suppression of organized crime tracks cases falling under category of the organized crime, 
whereby investigations of the corruption cases get secondary value, dependent upon investigative 
procedures conducted in cases that fit in the definition of organized crime. For instance Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s  has established the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime and Corruption, which has 
raised several indictments in the last one and a half years against ex-high officials, although State Court has 
not yet reached a valid verdict in any of these cases, except for setting free of charge in couple of cases. On 
the other hand, anti-corruption can be a primary focus of a law enforcement body, but this can than treat 
only lower levels of corruption. 
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intention of doing so) by introducing “independent” Anti-Corruption 
Agencies or Commissions. It is, of course, possible to combine such an 
Agency with the office of the conventional Ombudsman (as in Uganda and 
Papua New Guinea). Others would argue that there is a clear distinction 
between the two roles: that the Ombudsman is there to promote 
administrative fairness, and that this is best achieved by winning the 
confidence of the bureaucracy. An Agency or Commission which is also 
charged with the investigation and prosecution of public servants is more 
likely to be feared than trusted.” 
 
 
Further on, it has been elaborated why the Hong Kong model has proved effective:  
“This is not just because of the quality and determination of its staff, and 
of the excellent legal framework which has facilitated their work, but 
because the concepts of prevention and prosecution have both been 
functions of the Commission. Prevention has not been a last, single line - a 
draftsman’s after-thought - in the law establishing their responsibilities. 
Prevention (and the community education and awareness-raising that 
goes with it) has been a core activity of the Hong Kong model, often 
informed by the revelations of investigators working on the enforcement 
side. This enabled the Commission to develop a coherent and coordinated 
set of strategies, with results that are the envy of many. Those who have 
tried to copy the model have largely failed because they have lacked both 
this coherent approach and the resources necessary to carry it through. 
The usual “model” is the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against 
Corruption. This Commission serves not only to accept and investigate 
(but not prosecute) allegations of corruption, but also to run public 
awareness campaigns and to audit the management systems of individual 
government departments and agencies, from an anti-corruption 
perspective.” 
 
As a mater of fact, the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against corruption is an 
ideal paradigm of an anti-corruption agency, because it fits well here with the posed 
major parameters of independence, empowerment and specialization. It was mentioned 
that this Commission has power to accept and investigate allegations of corruption, next 
to the usual set of prevention measures, which, not diminishing their importance, are of 
less relevance for this research, since prevention has been envisaged as part of the 
concept of BHs anti-corruption body right from the very outset of public discussions 
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related to this issue, initiated primarily through the Stability Pact initiative.  However, 
one should not be misled that every anti-corruption agency can be celebrated about its 
success. Unfortunately, Hong Kong and Singapore are rare examples of the success, 
which can be owed to many different things. Those relevant to our research shall be 
mentioned in the ensuing part of this text. However, there is general impression that 
African models (Tanzania, Nigeria, Botswana etc) have failed, while Asian models 
(Hong Kong, Brunei, Bangladesh, Indonesia) have been successful. The former probably 
owe this to the different aspects related to the level of democratic development, whereby 
establishment of an effective anti-corruption agency can be dependent upon political 
culture, disposition of social vales, economic progression up to credibility of other law 
enforcement and judicial institutions, whose quality service directly or indirectly affects 
functioning of an anti-corruption agency. 
 
Independence of anti-corruption agency and how to achieve it 
 
Independence can be rightly named as a major conceptual characteristic of an efficient 
anti-corruption body. Although its meaning has been elaborated here, there is yet another 
question of the way in which it can be actually realized in a given context. As for the 
Hong Kong ICAC, it becomes clear that this has become possible because of several 
major preconditions: first of all there is a matter of credibility of a source of the initiative 
for the establishment of such a body. Namely, a good example is Governor of Hong 
Kong, who was able to push things forward by the strength of his public reputation an 
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authority.19Another important moment in providing grounds for a sustainable 
independence of ICAC was strong accountability mechanism. Namely, citizens’ advisory 
committees monitor the daily work of the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC), building added public confidence in this institution. 20  
A very important aspect of the independence and at the same time a recognized  
precondition for the success of an anti-corruption agency, is a solid financial basis for its 
operative activities and public understanding and support for its expenditures, because an 
under funded exercise will be doomed to failure. Some administrations provide their 
agencies with a “share” of what they recover, although this approach can lead to 
overzealousness and abuse.  
Hong Kong already had a functioning judicial system, upholding the Rule 
of Law, and a prosecution service that could be relied upon to exercise 
discretion to prosecute, and to conduct prosecutions, in a highly 
professional manner. (It subsequently prosecuted and jailed a director of 
public prosecutions when he stepped out of line.) Some such Agencies 
have failed to get started at all because of a reluctance (or refusal?) to 
make adequate resources available to them.21 
 
 
, which makes financial resources an important operative precondition for having a 
functional Commission. 
                                                 
19
 TI Source Book 2000: “Hong Kong started with unusual advantages. It had an expatriate senior 
public servant as its Governor and head of government, not someone with family and a history of 
connections in the then-colony, He enjoyed a handsome pension and high status in retirement. He was thus 
someone uniquely quarantined from most of the pressure points to which a local citizen can become 
subject.” 
 
20
 Ibid. “The Agency’s relationship with the public is also critical to success. Some Agencies, such as the 
highly-successful Hong Kong ICAC, have established formal arrangements whereby public participation in 
policy formulation is ensured. By providing for such an arrangement, which could take the form of a 
committee chaired by the Minister of Justice, the anti-corruption framework encourages public 
accountability. The relationship with the public is also important in laying the foundation for the 
“prevention” function of an Anti-Corruption Agency” 
21
 TI Source Book 2000, Chapter 11, pp. 95. 
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  There is also a technical aspect that is of critical importance for independence, 
which is namely the procedure of the appointment of the office holder. It is naturally 
desirable that independent agency has an independent and committed leader, but how can 
this be achieved in the best interest of the agencies independence? One of the principal 
proposals in dealing with this issue is that in the appointment procedure as much possible 
institutional actors should be involved. Appointment procedure focused on the executive 
branch is rather uncertain because it can be driven by narrow interests of a political party 
or even worst of the one single person.22 
The proper positioning of an anti-corruption office is of high relevance. It is good 
to place such an agency parallel to the highest executive footing, but in the same time to 
keep it separate and independent from it, and even to admit to the anti-corruption agency 
a principal monitoring status in relation to the highest levels of government. Otherwise 
the same would be at least deprived of its major reason d etre, while at worst it could be 
used as a mean for settlement of the political accounts. Also it is of highest importance to 
separate source of initiative from the relation of supremacy, which might follow this line 
of initiative. Again these issues have been finely resolved in HKs ICAC, but in 
Singapore’s Commission as well: 
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 TI Source Book 2000, Chapter 11: “. A flaw in many legislative schemes involves giving a President (or 
any political figure) too much control over the appointment and operations of an Anti-Corruption Agency. 
The President is the head of the Executive, and members of the Executive can also succumb to temptation. 
This could place the President in the impossible position of deciding whether or not to prosecute close 
political colleagues. As for the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a misusage of the agency by a one person, 
chief of the executive or president are minimized, since by the very nature of its constitutional arrangement, 
which is in essence a parliamentary one, it is unlikely to imagine a power been focused in the hands of the 
one person. Further more, because every BHs Government, up till now, had to be assembled by a very wide 
and often tough to reach political consensus. But another possibility, namely that the alleged misusage 
could involve political parties plots or those of different lobbies within parties themselves, is of a greater 
likelihood to happen. 
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” Success in Singapore owes much to the determination of its former 
Prime Minister and Head of Government, Lee Kuan Yew. Some writers 
have pointed to the Agency’s placement in the office of the Prime Minister 
as being an important factor in its success. The positioning of the office 
was also a key factor in Hong Kong’s highly successful onslaught, where 
it was placed in the office of the Governor, but where at the same time it 
reports to the Legislature and its separateness from the public service and 
its autonomy of operation were, and are, reflected in law and practice. “23 
 
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a parliamentary democracy and, on top 
of it, a post-conflict society with consociation principles involved, the highest source for 
credibility and initiative might be able to be found only in the state Parliament, which is 
the only true institutional crossing of intersegmentary political interests. Other executive 
functions have been perpetually distributed among ethic constituents, and as for now, 
among parties that have up to now shown minor level of mutual trust. Further on, a 
Parliament is a place which gathers largest spectra of political actors, which is a good 
ground for developing here mentioned accountability mechanisms, including appointing 
procedures, monitoring, control and definitely avoidance of the highest danger of miss 
usage of the agency for settlement of political accounts.  
 
Empowerment of anti-corruption agency 
 
As for the empowerment of an anti-corruption agency, it is where the principle takes 
place: it is not up to the gravity of the proscribed punishment, but to the likeliness to be 
caught. This is where true distinction between solid legal basis for action and empowered 
executive body comes to surface. The plain question deducible said the principle, is 
whether corruption can be fought off without a watchdog in the form of an agency as here 
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 Ibid. 
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argued, which presumes its empowerment in terms of provided operative abilities. The 
main pillars of empowerment are: special operative measures provided to the officers of 
such an agency; unimpeded access to necessary information24; public hearings25; 
monitoring assets and incomes of public sector decision-makers; freezing assets, seizing 
travel documents, protection of informers, professional privilege etc. Naturally, the only 
way to empower an anti-corruption body is a solid legal base that can open the path to 
efficient action. This can be nicely illustrated with the example of the Singapore 
Corruption Investigation Protection Bureau (CIPB), which was founded in 1952. 
However, only in 1960, a more effective legislation against corruption was introduced, 
that is the Prevention of Corruption Act was overhauled and additional powers of 
investigation were given to the CPIB and punishment enhanced. 26 It must be noted, 
however, that this was possible only after People's Action Party came into power in 1959, 
when a firm action plan was taken against corrupt officials, many of whom were 
dismissed from the service, while others left the service on their own to avoid 
investigation. The result was that public confidence in the CPIB grew as people realized 
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 Ibid. “Another important factor to be considered in establishing the legal framework for an 
Anti- Corruption Agency or Commission is that adequate powers are given to access documentation and to 
question witnesses. In some countries, efforts are made to restrict the access of an Agency to information. 
However, there is no reason, in theory or in practice, why an Agency ought not to enjoy, as the 
Ombudsman does, all the rights of law enforcement officers and full access to government documents and 
public servants.” 
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 Ibid: “The ICAC in New South Wales (Australia), another of the world’s leading Anti-Corruption 
Agencies, has for some years been empowered to hold public hearings. On these occasions, witnesses are 
summonsed to give evidence and although their evidence cannot be used against them in criminal 
proceedings, the hearings provide an opportunity to enlighten the public as to precisely what has been 
taking place. Once illegal and highly questionable patterns of behavior have been exposed in this way, it is 
reasonable to expect that those involved are likely to be shamed into changing their ways.” 
26
 See www.anti-corruption.gov.bn: “The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 241, today provides the 
CPIB with all the necessary powers to fight corruption. In 1989, the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) 
Act was passed. The Act empowers the court to freeze and confiscate properties and assets obtained by 
corrupt offenders.  In 1999, the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act was replaced with a new 
legislation called the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) 
Act. New legislation against money laundering has been introduced in addition to giving the same powers 
to the court for the freezing and confiscation of properties and assets by offenders.” 
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that the Government was sincere in its anti-corruption drive.27 This illustrates the 
importance of political will vis-à-vis the establishment of an efficient anti-corruption 
body, which makes examination of this variable important part of this research. 
There is another important aspect of empowerment, which is namely its 
dependency. The point is that any anticorruption agency, even if given wide investigative 
powers, is always dependent upon the efficiency of the prosecution force. Namely, if the 
judiciary and prosecution are not functioning well, either in terms of being perceived as 
corrupt or incapable due to suffocation with loads of cases, what might be perceived as 
equivalent to inefficiency, then public credibility of the agency itself cannot be preserved. 
Again this issue has been recognized in the TI Source Book, by referring to the Hong 
Kong Commission:  
 
“The relationship between the Anti-Corruption Agency and the Director 
of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is also a critical one. What use is evidence 
if the suspect cannot be prosecuted? Generally a DPP is given, under the 
Constitution, sole oversight for all prosecutions and is empowered to 
intervene in any criminal proceedings initiated by any other person or 
authority. However, in assessing the independence and the likely 
effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Agency, the question arises whether, 
under the Constitution, the DPP enjoys sufficient independence in 
exercising the discretion to prosecute so as to ensure that there will be 
little scope for political interference after investigations by the Agency 
have been completed.”28  
 
 
As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, although huge amounts of money have been fused into 
the two waves of reforms of BH judiciary, there still remains the fact that this 
prosecutive-judicial segment of BH administration has to work hard in order to earn and 
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maintain its reputation in the society, in which now for some time persists low faith in 
public institutions, along with the general feeling of social apathy. Not to mention issues 
often noted by the media: the lack of physical incapacity to process large amounts of 
cases, exposure to political pressures that are, in spite to the reform, difficult to rule out; 
lack of concrete results (up till now no single valid verdict against ex medium/high 
functionaries has been brought). There is also the fact that BH judiciary has not yet been 
accustomed to the reformed Penal Code, which has introduced novelties imported 
directly from the USAs penal legislation (e.g. cancellation of examining magistrate and 
empowering of prosecutors function, introduced bargaining methods etc.). In these 
circumstances, it is legitimate to ask what the perspectives on the herein argued anti-
corruption body in Bosnia and Herzegovina are. This relation obviously needs to be 
examined as well, within the course of our planed research by both examining groups: 
parliamentarians and experts. 
 
Other relevant models 
 
The success of Asian model, featured in previous discussion, could seem distant in many 
ways from countries such a Bosnia and Herzegovina, which might be used as an 
argument against the compatibility of a strong anti-corruption agency concept in our 
domestic context. The majority of Western countries29 have anticorruption units as an 
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 Ackermann S, (1999) yet to find source: with the exception of France, other West European states use 
this institutional frame to deal with the corruption, but the lack of a separate and empowered anti-
corruption agency might be argued by the fact that those countries have well developed democratic system, 
where other institutions in this respect bare large loads of work. In U.S. the situation is somewhat specific, 
by many influenced by the Watergate affair from 70ties, which had heavily shaken public trust in 
Government. Namely,  there is the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) which functions preventional, but 
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integral part of their prosecution offices, which is, at the moment very much the case in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. Although this approach can be defended in the light of 
overall democratic development, it could be misleading in the case of the transitional 
democracies and specifically when speaking about post-conflict societies, where overall 
stability constantly remains at stake, being viewed as a primary focus and so as an 
impediment to any swift and decisive reform moves. 
As for the transitional states, fortunately there are already a couple of successful 
examples of anti-corruption agencies established, namely the two Baltic States of Latvia 
and Lithuania. Lithuania has its Special Investigation Service (STT), which could be, for 
instance, used as a model for Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, both countries are post 
communist; experiencing ethnic complexities, although in somewhat different manner; 
both are finally European states and face more or less the same transitional problems. In 
the Lithuanian case it becomes clear that corruption has been inherited from the 
communist regime and thereof the battle against corruption can be viewed as an integral 
part of transitional development.30 Thereby, as seen in the case of Asian models, a solid 
legal basis was once again a prerequisite to empower STT officers to deal with corruption 
                                                                                                                                                 
strongly cooperates with other institutions and watches out on the respect of the individual codes of ”: 
www.usinfo.state.gov 
30
 STT: “Since the adoption of the Act of Independence in 1990, efforts have been made to forestall 
corruption in Lithuania. Nevertheless, there were clear traces of symbiosis of organized crime groups and 
corrupt public officials. With corruption invading into government institutions and the crime situation 
getting worse, the general public began to lose confidence in law enforcement and other bodies, and the 
rule of law was put at risk.  
With that in mind, the Government established the Special Investigation Service under the Ministry of the 
Interior on 18 February 1997. The tasks of the Service were to collect and use intelligence about criminal 
associations and corrupt public officials as well as carry out prevention activities.” 
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in an effective manner.31 As for the independence of Lithuanian STT, experience has 
shown that more accountability mechanisms need to be employed via adequate legal 
solutions, which is why the Special Law on STT was enacted.32 It is also important to 
notice that an independent anti-corruption body does not mean that it is isolated at the 
same time: on the contrary, the same has to be source of the initiative for bringing wider 
anti-corruption measures at national level, which clearly illustrates the case of STT. 
Latvia is an even better example for the purpose of grounding discussion of the 
independent, empowered and specialized anti-corruption body to the size and possibilities 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two countries, in addition to the usual transitional 
similarities, have nearly the same population and, while, Latvia is only somewhat better 
of economically than BH, it still was able to develop and sustain its Corruption 
Prevention and Combating Bureau (CPCB) with roughly 600 officers and other staff 
working there. The Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (CPCB) of Latvia has 
a statutory duty to submit its activity report to the Cabinet of Ministers and to the 
Parliament, at least once in every six months. Since the moment when CPCB became 
fully operation (February 2003), the same has submitted five of such reports of 
approximately 25 to 35 pages in length.  
 
In addition CPCB has assumed an obligation to present an overview of its 
activities at least once every six months to its Consultative Council (where 
non-governmental organizations are represented) as well as to give 
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 STT: “Respective legislation of the Republic of Lithuania grants general and special rights to the STT 
officer facilitating prevention and investigation of corruption. The STT officer has the right to: 
monitor mail and electronic communications; covertly monitor a person's correspondence, telegraph and 
other communications, wiretap telephone conversations and make their recordings;  model conduct 
simulating a criminal act; use special equipment; covertly monitor residential premises; enter the premises 
of enterprises, institutions and organizations and inspect them etc”. 
32
 See the Web page of Lithuanian Special Investigation Service www.stt.lt. 
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explanations if the Bureau fails to implement the Council’s 
recommendations. According to the State Program for the Prevention and 
Combating of Corruption for Years 2004-2008 all agencies, which have 
been assigned specific tasks under this program, are required to report to 
CPCB on the progress of implementation biannually.33  
 
 
Scheme of the Latvian CPCB 
 
As for the situation in the immediate surroundings there is only the case of Croatia, where 
an anti-corruption body has been established. After more than two years in operation, 
meeting difficulties related to the lack of the actual independence and operative 
modalities, the Office for Prevention of Corruption and Organized Crime in Republic of 
Croatia (USKOK), set up a working party on the creation and implementation of 
amendments to its Charter in March, 2004. The changes are being sought to ensure that 
USKOK has the power to work more effectively with the police and other state bodies, 
and to take a leading role in the investigation of criminal matters. According to 
information from the state attorney’s office, USKOK has received 410 reports accusing 
261 people during 2003, of which 57 were sent for trial: 1 TI CR 2004. 
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POSITION OF POLITICAL AND EXPERT COMMUNITIES IN BH VIS-A-VIS 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRONG ANTI-CORRUPTION BODY 
 
General remarks about research materials 
 
For the purpose of examining the quality and strength the political will for the 
establishment of an anti-corruption body in BH, we have distributed questionnaires to BH 
Parliamentarians, whom from, at the time being, we have received eight answers. Seven 
of the received answers were filled out by the members of the parties who represent 
opposition in BH Parliament, while only one was completed by one of the national 
parties composing ruling position. The former could imply lack of interest in these issues, 
due to several possible reasons: it is an uncomfortable subject, which is in accordance to 
the premises outlined in the introductory part of the research. Namely, ruling position in 
ideological and also, considerably, in personal sense, seems to be burdened by the 
residues of the last conflict, being aware of the potential connection of their ex or present 
members with illegal activities, which could weaken their overall position. The other 
possible reason could be general lack of interest in subject area, possibly perceived as 
being off the present political agenda.  The former should not be the case, since 
corruption is a socio-political phenomenon that requires continuous attention. A 
government that displays lack of readiness to deal sincerely and resolutely with these 
issues hardly can win the sympathies of the publicity, at least not lasting ones. The 
opposition seems to be keen to inaugurate strong anti-corruption measures and 
 29 
accordingly identifies corruption as a grave problem. In several cases they have as well 
used sharp comments to bolster their anti-corruption orientation and interest.  
 On the other side, members of the addressed expert community have shown more 
willingness and interest in the subject, by providing 21 filled questionnaires, completed 
by the high ranking servants in State and Entity institutions that are involved in present 
initiatives related to anti-corruption actions in BH. On the other hand they have displayed 
high concern for discretion of the research methods, being somewhat suspicious and 
apprehensive in expressing themselves about subject issues, probably because of the 
perceived taboo of corruption issues in general. In addition to this, the impression is that 
public servants in BH don’t feel sovereign and secure enough to articulate themselves 
about subject issues, although the research itself was anonymous. The implication is that 
similar research needs to be conducted further, so that an adequate cooperative culture of 
public responsibility and connectivity could be furthered.   
 There has to be noticed, however, that one other important aspect of this research 
was realized even in this earlier phase, which is namely heterogeneity of respondents in 
terms of sex, age and nationality. Nationality is a particularly important category, since 
research of this or similar types draw their validity also from the crossectoral – national 
character of the research. This also helps to see inasmuch certain questions produce 
group’s implications, esp. in BH as multilayered - multicultural society.  
 The questions posed to the Parliamentarians can be sorted in two groups, namely 
those aimed at the assessment of the general perception of the corruption problem by this 
group, and correspondently the sort of measures they are prepared to accept, in terms of 
the institutional response presented to them in the form of an empowered, specialized and 
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independent anti-corruption body. The questionnaires presented to the expert group are 
almost the same, except for five questions, which were explicitly technical and 
professional. The next section assesses the two groups’ attitudes and compares them with 
reference to the questions that were identical to both groups and in accordance with the 
overall goals of this research. 
 
Parliamentarian response  
 
Based on the received answers from the group of Parliamentarians, it is clear that the 
majority of them see the problem of corruption in BH as important, and they see its focal 
point as being in administrations, not among politicians, doctors and other offered 
groups. As for the key opportunity to better fight against corruption they have pointed out 
equally: development of the specialized institutions, profesionalisation of the 
investigators and focusing the problem at the state level. The position that corruption has 
been more dispersed in BH than in other countries has gained a slight edge over the sense 
that corruption is more-less equal in BH as in other countries, while only one respondent 
signaled that corruption in BH is not more dispersed as in other countries. Former 
question goes along ensued slight edge of the position that corruption in BH is 
progressing over the one that we classified as a permanent and constant phenomena. Only 
one respondent thought corruption is falling in BH. However the top answer featuring 
their disposition toward the problem of corruption in BH, relates to the unanimous 
dissatisfaction with what has been done so far on the plan of fight against corruption. 
Five respondents hold that, for successful fight against corruption, bigger importance 
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play efforts taken via national anti-corruption programs, while three of them hold those 
are of equal importance. However, none of them thinks that national programs are less 
important than regional programs.  
 The perception of the negative connection between political and administrative 
sector in BH is quite clear, namely a great majority of respondents feels that those are 
narrowly connected, which leaves space for corrupt activities. In connection to that, the 
next question verifies their attitude about the former one: again a large majority thinks 
that there is negative cohesion of the administrative and political sector in BH, because of 
the recidivism of the last conflict, which is still strongly present in the BH governmental-
administrative system. The majority of respondents also believe that if there a lustration 
process would have been conducted in the post-war period, the level of corruption would 
be lower today, while only one stated that the level of corruption would be even greater. 
We should add to this that one respondent left a blank field, maybe because of 
indecisiveness, or because of lack of familiarity to the term of lustration; or it is simply 
an omission. 
 The next explicitly probed parliamentarian’s position toward the eventual 
inauguration of a specialized, empowered and independent anti-corruption body in BH. 
Further to that, only one respondent admitted that he was familiar with the concept of an 
anti-corruption body, while others admitted they had basic knowledge, whereas one had 
no knowledge at all. The key question about the current necessity for such a body in BH 
was signalled by 6 respondents as necessary, due to the general gravity of the problem of 
corruption in the country, while two respondents showed concern and scepticism toward 
the efficiency of those bodies in general and the possibility of realizing major 
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requirements of an anti-corruption body, namely its financial and political independence. 
As for the perception of the general political will for establishment of anti-corruption 
body, the majority of respondents believed that such political will does not exist. 
However, they admitted that the idea could be good for BH, but they don’t believe in the 
possibility of obtaining political consensus about this issue. Only one respondent believes 
that there is political will, but the question was not examined and actualized enough, 
while one is of the belief that political will is not strong enough. 
 In accordance with the ongoing initiative to situate investigatory section of the 
anti-corruption office under umbrella of the Ministry of Security, namely its sub 
organisation SIPA (State Investigation and Protection Agency), 6 respondents think that 
is not a god idea in terms of preserving independence, empowering and specialization, as 
the major standards of functional anti-corruption body. The Parliamentarians were 
generally for strong empowerment of the officers of the anti-corruption office, while on 
top of it, three delegates think that there should be added, along to high investigative 
powers, a prosecutive function and authorization as well. Only one respondent holds that 
anti-corruption officers should have classical powers given to police officers in BH.  
 The overview of the position of the respondents about satisfaction about present 
legislative frame for fight against corruption in BH is quite clear: seven respondent think 
there has been little done on this plan and notice lack of “friendly laws”. Only one 
representative belonging to one of the ruling parties believes that until present enough 
has been done, but the legislative framework still has weak spots. The same pattern of 
response aligns to the next question about territorial authority of the eventual anti-
corruption body in BH: seven respondents believe that such body should have 
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unconditional application to all territory of BH, while again the ruling position 
respondent from the R. Srpska believes that function of that body should be conditioned 
exclusively by cooperation with other Entity and State organs.  
 As for the accountability issue, 100% of questionnaires believe that control of the 
work of such a body should be performed by the Commission of the State Parliament, 
while no one was of the opinion that this should be done by the Presidency, Council of 
Ministers or President of the Council of Ministers.  
 As for the inquiry related to question of whether the present administrative 
organization of BH presents obstacles in terms of realization of a strong concept of anti-
corruption body, six respondents see it as an obstacle while two of them, including one 
from the R. Srpska, believe that is not the case. As for the examining connectivity of anti-
corruption body and its establishment with the idea of vital national interest of BH 
ethnicities, 50% of the respondents believe those issues are completely independent and 
do not correlate at all, while 50% believes there is either small, pretty big or strong 
connection between two issues. The former implies that the question of an anti-corruption 
body as outlined here, if it reaches level of public-political debate and finally gets 
actualized in BH Parliament, could be viewed as an impediment for actual-prevailing 
conceptions of national-ethnic interests in BH, which could certainly deflect initiatives 
for installation of strong anti-corruption body. 
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Resume of the Parliamentarians position 
 
As it has been previously seen the respondents from the group of Parliamentarians 
supplied following feed back: 
- Respondents perceive corruption in BH as a serious phenomenon, which has 
tendency of growth and should be addressed on the national level;  
- Respondents also admit negative connectivity of the administrative and political 
sector as a residuum of the last war, whether in terms of inherited nepotism, 
private, political or criminal connections. (The former could imply the existence 
of the sense of the lack of de facto independence of the administration with regard 
to political sector, as naturally superior and still opt for nurturing informal 
connections in BH governmental-political system, as possible atavism of the last 
war); 
-  Respondents lack a basic familiarity with the possibilities in searching for the 
institutional part of the response to the challenges of corruption in BH (The 
former finding implies the necessity for further research and advocacy work in 
subject field). 
- The majority of respondents holds that BH needs specialized, empowered and 
independent anti-corruption body, which would be able to deal with all levels of 
corruption, especially those gravest ones,  
- Respondents considerably doubt in the possibility of achieving primarily financial 
and political independence of such a body.  
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- The prevalent assessment that there is no political will for inauguration of such a 
body, or at least that there is no in sufficient measure, could seem to contradict the 
previously expressed view that BH is in real need for such a body. However, we 
should note that only one respondent belongs to the ruling group, while the rest of 
them are oppositionist’s parties, which reveals a lot about the positioning of the 
ruling parties visa vi subject mater.  
- Majority of respondents have supported a high level of empowerment of the anti 
corruption body and territorial supremacy in corruption cases over all the territory 
of BH, while only one respondent from R. Srpska replied that such a body should 
not go around already existent Entity institutions and other state ones. (We can 
only assume that a similar position would be shared with other respondents 
delegated from R. Srpska, who traditionally share status quo sentiment and 
scepticism toward centralization initiatives. It is very likely that this discourse 
could include the issue of protection of the vital national interest, which, although 
here largely delivered by oppositional parties, tends to be to a certain measure in 
connection to the initiative for anti-corruption body with high investigative 
powers, complete independence and inherence over all territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina).  
 
Expert group position 
 
The expert community is composed of the chief and high officers out of major Law 
Enforcement State and Entity institutions, and also prevalently perceives the corruption 
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problem in BH as big - eight respondents and very big – six respondents, but also as a 
problem that is no bigger than other problems which BH is facing – six respondents. 
Unlike parliamentarians, examined expert community recognizes that the most corrupted 
social group are actually politicians – 7 and administrative workers – 5. Most of them 
perceive profesionalisation of the investigation officers as a primary opportunity for the 
successful fight against corruption, while equal number of them – 5, holds that an answer 
lies in development of specialized institutions and corruption fight on the state level. Four 
respondents favour provision of financial means as a key for successful allocation of the 
anti-corruption efforts. 
 Interestingly, the majority holds that corruption in BH is more or less the same as 
in other countries – 14, whereas smaller number - 6 holds that corruption in BH is bigger 
than in other countries. A majority of 13 respondents holds that corruption in BH is 
permanent and steady phenomena, while a smaller number – 8, feels that the same is 
rising. The respondents also gave particularly strong equal weight to the national 
programs and regional initiatives, while 6 of them prefer solely national programs. 
However, they are equally 100% unsatisfied, the same as Parliamentarians are, with what 
has been done up until now on the plan of fight against the corruption on the national 
level.  
 Most of the respondents – 9, are of opinion that political and administrative 
sectors in BH are narrowly connected, which leaves space for corrupt activities, while 6 
have chosen a somewhat milder option, namely that their narrow connectivity could 
represent a negative factor. Only one respondent feels those two sectors are completely 
independent from one another. This is ascertained by the attitude about the existence of 
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the negative cohesion of the administrative and political sectors in BH, as recidivism of 
the last war. Nine of the respondents hold that this cohesion is still present in a certain 
measure, while 8 of them think that this connectivity is still strong; whereas three 
respondents believe that there is strong cohesion, which is a direct consequence of the 
last war. Again, only one respondent feels that such cohesion does not exist at all. 
 Interestingly, the great majority, namely 16 respondents hold that the level of 
corruption would be lower if a lustration process had been conducted within the state 
apparatus. Only one respondent is of opinion that lustration would only deteriorate 
corruption, while two of them believe that level of corruption would not be lower and 
two hold that lustration would have no influence to the corruption.  As for the presence 
of the “state capture” phenomenon in BH society, the majority of 10 respondents believe 
that this phenomenon is present in BH society and that it represents a great menace for 
the same; 7 respondents hold that there is “state capture” in BH as a consequence of the 
recent war, but that this shall vanish through post-conflict stabilization and the transition 
of BH society. No one believes that the “state capture” phenomenon is not present, or 
that the same is present to a certain measure, but it does not represent a serious problem. 
Only one respondent thinks that BH judicial system can handle practical reflexions of the 
“state capture” phenomena in BH, and only one respondent thinks that this phenomenon 
is decreasing, due to the achieved institutional development of the BH court-judicial 
system in the after-war period of BH development. 
 Quite surprisingly, 9 respondents had only a superficial knowledge of the concept 
of anti-corruption body as outlined in the theoretical part of this research; 6 respondents 
were more or less familiar with the concept, 4 of them were not familiar at all, while 
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only two respondents had a fair knowledge of the concept and know its practical 
examples in other countries. Interestingly, none of the respondents had a very good 
knowledge of the concept, its advantages and lacking. As for the recognition of the need 
of such an anti-corruption body in BH, the majority of respondents – 13 felt that BH 
requires such a body, due to the gravity of corruption, while 11 held that it is not 
possible, at present, to realize basic parameters of what we have argued here is a strong 
concept of anti-corruption body, especially with regard to its financial and political 
independence. Only one person felt unsure about it, because of a general suspicion in the 
efficiency of such bodies. However, no one believes that BH does not need an anti-
corruption body. Some of the respondents, who are of opinion that BH needs an anti-
corruption body, have also disclosed a dose of scepticism, by circling as well an option 
about the impossibility of insuring independence and other relevant parameters of an 
anti-corruption body. 
 The perception of the political will for the establishment of anti-corruption body 
in BH, among expert, community is more colourful.  Namely, the majority of 8 
respondents feels that the idea of an anti-corruption body, as outlined above, is a good 
one and that the same could be useful for BH, but it is impossible to reach overall 
political consensus about this issue. Five respondents think that there is no sufficient level 
of political will and five hold that the political will is there, but the question is not 
researched and actualized enough. Two respondents are of the opinion that there is no 
political will whatsoever, while only one person states unconditionally that there is 
political will in BH for realization of such a project. 
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 We also probed the technical aspect of the possibility that investigatory section of 
a prospective anti-corruption office body should be with in SIPA (suborganisation of the 
Ministry of Security BH). The majority, numbering 12 questionnaires feels that former 
would not be a good solution vis-à-vis securing independence and self-sufficiency of an 
anti-corruption body in infrastructural, operative and even in political sense. However, 5 
respondents were of the opposite opinion and they favoured the suggested solution, while 
4 others were not sure about the possible connotations of such organizational solution. 
Highest level of authorization of an anti-corruption body and its officers was supported 
by 14 respondents, while 5 of respondents would add to it a prosecutive function as well. 
Only two respondents argue for classical police authorizations and two limited 
themselves sole to preventory and coordinatory role of central anti-corruption office in 
BH.  
 As for the achieved results in building legislative frame for anti-corruption fight, 
11 respondents held that little have been one in subject field, while 9 hold that enough 
was done, but legislative frame still has some week points. Only one respondent thinks 
that present situation in this field is satisfactory.  Majority of 17 respondents feels that an 
anti-corruption body should be able to conduct investigative actions on all territory of 
BH, while only one person thinks that something like that is not in accordance with the 
Constitutional spirit of BH. Three respondents consider that such agency can not operate 
self-sufficiently, but only in cooperation with other relevant Entity and State organs. As a 
mechanism for control of the anti-corruption body, majority of experts, namely 10 of 
them, recommend Parliamentary Assembly of BH, while seven have recommend the 
commission be close to the President of the Council of Ministers BH. Four respondents 
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recommended the commission be close to Council of Ministers, while no one 
recommended Presidential control of the anti-corruption body. 
 A slight majority of questionnaires – 8 of them, were of the opinion that the 
present administrative-political organization of BH and its decentralization hinder the 
possibility of the realization of a strong concept of anti-corruption body, whereas seven 
were uncertain and thought this could be a case. Five respondents thought there are no 
administrative – organizational impediments in the way of eventual realization of the 
strong concept of an anti-corruption body in BH. 
 The next set of questions was designed specifically for the group of experts as it 
was assumed that they were well informed about the subject area and in a position to 
answer more specialized questions. Namely, we asked whether for a successful fight 
against corruption already existing court - judicial institutions in BH would suffice. A 
great majority of respondents informed that primary institutions are not enough, while 
only 3 respondents had the opposite opinion. As for the belief that the BH prosecutive-
judicial system in BH is reformed enough, 14 respondents answered negatively, namely 
holding that the same could not follow/service operations of the strong anti-corruption 
body. However, 6 respondents had contrary opinion and they disclosed faith in capacities 
of BH judicial system. 
 The majority of 18 respondents also held that preventive actions and successful 
follow up of the corruption trends on the state level correspondently requires a central 
anti-corruption body, while only 3 respondents felt that this was not the case. Seven 
respondents believed that an anti-corruption body should be dealing with all types of 
corruption and four that it should be dealing only with gravest corruption cases. No one, 
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however, recommended that such a body should focus only corruption on the local level. 
Somewhat depressing is the view of the majority of respondents, namely 14 of them, who 
believe that at present it is not possible to ensure the complete independence of an anti-
corruption body from political interference and influences. As a contrast, only half of that 
number, namely 7, believes the opposite. 
 
Resume of experts position vis-à-vis the one of the parliamentarians 
 
Based on here gathered samples, we were able to see following: 
 
- That in recognizing the gravity of the problem of corruption in BH, both groups 
of respondents have designated the named problem as serious. What they differ 
about, is that politicians perceive a focus of corruption in administration, while 
experts are more inclined to believe that the main corruption lies in political 
circles;   
- Parliamentarians feel that chance for successful fight against corruption should be 
looked at prevalently in the development of specialized institutions and dealing 
with the problem on the state level, instead on lower administrative levels. On the 
other side, experts are primarily concerned with the professionalism of the 
investigative officers;  
- The professionals, also quite convincingly, support the thesis that corruption in 
BH is more or less as widespread as in other countries, whereas parliamentarians, 
somewhat more, suggested that corruption in BH is greater than in other 
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countries. Accordingly experts believe that corruption in BH is continuous - 
permanent, whereas a slight majority of parliamentarians feels that the same has 
tendency of growth; 
- While the majority of experts hold that the quality of national programs and 
regional initiatives are equally important for the successful fight against 
corruption, parliamentarians are more inclined to national programs.  However, 
one thing is for sure: none of the examined groups is satisfied with what has been 
so far achieved in the field of anti-corruption in BH;  
- Quite compatible answers have been offered in asserting whether there is a 
negative connection of the administrative and political sectors in BH, as 
favourable for the wide spread prevalence and exercise of corrupt activities. They 
all generally agree that there is a negative connectivity of two mentioned sectors, 
which, either could be a negative factor, or already opens room for corrupt 
activities;  
- Both groups agreed that the level of corruption would be smaller if there had been 
lustration process in the after-war period, and they also agree that “state capture” 
phenomena is present in BH and represents great menace for BH society; 
- As for the familiarity with the concept of an anti-corruption body, it is surprising 
that both groups have roughly the same deficits in knowledge. Surprisingly, none 
of the respondents out of the expert group possessed a very good knowledge of 
the anti-corruption body concept, its advantages and disadvantages, while four of 
the respondents had virtually no knowledge of the mentioned concept; 
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- While politicians, in the majority, believe that BH needs a strong anti-corruption 
body, although somewhat doubting in its efficiency, experts are on the other side 
more divided about this question. Namely, almost equally as they recognize the 
need for such a body, they show concern that in the present circumstances in BH 
it is not possible to realize the basic requirements of a specialized, empowered 
and independent anti-corruption body, particularly with regard to its financial and 
political independence;  
- Both groups share the opinion that there is at present no political will for 
establishing of such a body, or that, although the idea it self might be good for 
BH, they doubt it is possible to reach overall political consensus about this 
important issue. However, experts are a bit more optimistic: they also generally 
suggest that there is not enough political will for the realization of an institution, 
or in other words, that the question itself has not been researched or advocated 
enough; 
- While the majority of both groups holds that it would not be a correct  solution to 
situate the investigative branch of the prospective anti-corruption office within the 
auspices of SIPA Department of the Ministry of Security, there is noticeable 
uncertainty among expert group about the possible consequences of this action; 
- Both groups are equally pro high investigative powers of the anti-corruption 
investigators, while some of them even support the possibility of uniting the 
prosecutive and investigatory functions in an infrastructural and operational 
sense; 
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- Whereas parliamentarians expressed themselves quite unanimously -- that there 
has not been enough done in the field of legislative response to the problem of 
corruption and that there is a lack of “friendly laws” -- experts are slightly more 
inclined to believe that a lot has been done, but that the legislative framework still 
has weak spots; 
- The majority of both groups favour high investigative powers of the anti-
corruption agency over all the territory of BH;  
- Finally, the majority of both groups agreed that the administrative-political 
organization of BH could represent an impediment for the operationalization of a 
strongly conceptualized anti-corruption body. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Although parliamentarians have generally admitted the existence of corruption, as a real 
and grave phenomenon, they are not ready to accept its political dimension as a 
particularly important one. Consequently, they might not be interested in the installation 
of the body which would be a watch-dog of the corrupt behaviour on all political-
administrative levels. However, both groups have shown dissatisfaction with anti-
corruption actions produced until now, which is a good environment for the affirmation 
of specific anti-corruption initiatives, such as this one.  
 A lot of doubts have been expressed from both expert and political levels, namely 
that it would be impossible to have a body with a high level of political and material 
independence; and also that the administrative-political organization (constitutional 
categories) might get in the way of the realization of such body and, correspondingly, that 
the same could be blocked by revitalization of the discourse about protection of “vital 
national (ethnic) interests”. 
 However, in spite of these expressed doubts and scepticism, attention should be 
paid to the fact that both groups have insufficient knowledge of the possibilities and 
capacities of a strongly institutionalized anti-corruption body, which is something that 
needs to be remedied. Better knowledge of the issue could ameliorate distrust and 
embolden attitudes towards such an initiative.  
 It should be also taken into account that both examined groups have disclosed a 
general lack of trust in the level of democratic development of BH society, which 
considerably conditions their attitude about subject matter. Namely, both groups have 
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recognized the presence of negative connectivity of the administrative and political 
sectors in BH, as recidivism of the recent war. Such connectivity ensures a simulative 
environment for further corruptive activities. There is a clear correlation between 
lustration and corruption, and both groups shared the concern that responsible political-
administrative functions could, and probably are, still held by “irresponsible” persons, 
who represent a network of informal connections and interests, which can substantially 
postpone democratic development. Otherwise, if it is too late for s lustration process, then 
it is not too late for strong anti-corruption body, which can handle the problem and 
gradually “clean up” the public-political sector. 
 We should add to this that experts have shown more optimism with regard to this 
issue, which could be communicated to decision-makers, as an enticement for advancing 
the institutional aspect of the anti-corruption struggle. The experts have pointed to the 
present, but insufficiently comprehensive, legislative frame for the anticorruption 
struggle. They also noted that the subject needs to be further researched and advocated, 
so that the willingness of political actors can be brought about.  
 
Recommended measures: 
   
- To draw the attention of the public and interested actors to the continuing 
negative cohesion of the administrative and political sectors, especially vis-à-vis 
their physical (e.g. mechanisms of personal nomination, formal and informal 
leverages of influence etc.) and socio-psychological (administrative, namely 
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professional officers  still don’t feel safe and secure enough, and correspondingly 
independent from the political influences) correlation; 
- To propose an environment of dialog between the expert and political 
communities; enhance they interaction with a view of sharing knowledge and 
visions of the subject,  by referring to the high awareness of the corruption 
phenomenon, that BH indeed needs such a body (BH will eventually have some 
kind of an anti-corruption body, but what kind will it be?). The problem 
articulated here suggests that there is a real need for a strong and effective, instead 
of the formal coordinatory-preventory anti-corruption body in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, whose independence and autonomy should be of highest concern, 
due to the delicacy of its task, on one side, and persistence of immature 
democracy and weak democratic practices, on the other); 
- Further reforms and enhancements of the operative abilities of the judicial and 
law enforcement services, as auxiliary institutions in the context of the 
anticorruption struggle, whose quality of work affects  the quality of an anti-
corruption agency; 
- Development of specialized departments in key institutions (Financial Action 
Unit, Financial Police, Office for Indirect Taxation, State and Entity Prosecutions, 
State Police – SIPA; Internal control organs); 
- Further professional development and training of  the officers whose work is 
related to the anti-corruption struggle, with a view to  creating the required 
number of well trained and highly professional individuals, who would be the 
core of anti-corruptive action by the side of Bosnian anti-corruption office; 
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- To campaign for the raising of public sensibility and overall feeling for 
fundamental accountability principles, in order to deliver pressure that would be 
mediated to decision makers; 
- Finally and most importantly, this research has shown that there exists awareness, 
both in the political and administrative segments, concerning the corruption 
phenomenon in BH, and it has delineated the connection between the post-conflict 
development of this country and the heavy corruption in its administrative-
political system. This work suggest, as a response to the post-conflict peculiarity 
of corruption in BH, which is primarily administrative-political, the establishment 
of a strongly empowered; highly professionalized, central anti-corruption body, 
specialized in corruption, whose independence and public stand and authority 
would allow it to investigate top level corruption cases on all administrative and 
political levels, which would then be accordingly treated by the prosecutive-
judicial branch. 
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Questionnaire on the position of the members of the Working group of the Council 
of Ministers for fight against corruption  and members of the Working group for 
drafting Office for fight against corruption 
 
 
Respected, 
 
 
This questionnaire was designed to examine opinion of the members of a/m expert 
groups in respect to establishment of the unique body for fight against corruption in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where main purpose is to oppose corruption threat in as much 
successful manner. It is completely anonymous, which means that researcher is not 
interested for the identity of questioned person, nor shall the results be used to any other 
purpose but scientific one. The researcher is at the disposal of respondents for any 
informations related to this research. 
 
Please provide one answer – one option per question! 
 
 
Thank You in advance for your cooperation! 
 
 
1. Respondents sex 
 
1. male 
2. female 
 
2. Year of birth_____________________________ 
3. Place of residence_________________________ 
4. Nationality – ethnicity_______________________ 
 
5. How big, in your opinion, is the problem of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  
 
1. very big 
2. big 
3. average, no bigger than other problems 
4. small 
5. not a problem at all 
 
 6. Where, in your opinion, the corruption is most dispersed? 
 
1. in the administration 
2. among politicians 
3. among medicine workers 
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4. among university professors 
5. something else________________________________ 
 
7. Where do you think the opportunity for more successful fight against corruption should 
be sought? 
 
1. better financial means 
2. better cooperation with other institutions 
3. profesionalisation of the investigative officers 
4. dealing with the corruption on the state level 
5. development of specialised institutions 
6. something else_____________________________________________ 
 
 
8. Do you believe that corruption is more present in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in 
other countries? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. More – less as in other countries 
 
9. Do you think that corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rising or falling?  
 
1. it is rising 
2. it falls down 
3. corruption in BH is a permanent phenomena 
 
10. What is more relevant for the fight against corruption, regional initiatives or strong 
national programs? 
 
1. more significant are regional initiatives such as the one of the Stability Pact 
2. more significant are quality national programs 
3. their significance is of equal weight 
 
11. Are you content with what has been done so far in the field of anti-corruption fight at 
BHs national level? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
12. How do you estimate the relation between administrative and political sectors on 
different levels in BH, in the sense of the possibilities that such connection open for 
corrupt actions in BHs administrative-political system? 
 
1. those are narrowly connected, but that fact is not relevant for corruption 
2. those are narrowly connected, which could be a negative factor 
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3. narrowly connected, which opens wide space for corruptive actions 
4. medium connected, but they do not condition one another – in that sense there 
is no particular fear for corruption 
5. separate and completely independent – their relation is irrelevant for question 
of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
13. Do you deem that there is a negative cohesion34 of administrative and political sectors 
in BH as recidivism of the recent war? 
 
1. such cohesion does not exist 
2. it existed immediately after the war, now not any more 
3. it is still present to a certain measure 
4. there is strong connection between those two sectors 
5. there is strong connection between those two sectors and the same is direct 
result of the war 
 
14. Do you think that corruption would be lower in the after war period of BH 
development if there would had been lustration of the whole administrative - political 
system in BH? 
 
1. Yes – the corruption would be lower 
2. No – the corruption would not be lower 
3. If there would had been lustration process, the corruption problem now would 
be even bigger 
4. lustration has no influence to corruption 
 
15. Scientific literature dealing with issues of corruption knows the term “state 
capture”35. Do you think this phenomena is present in BH society and, if so, to what 
measure? 
 
1. State capture is not present in BH society 
2. it is present to a certain measure but it represent no serious problem 
3. that is an occasional phenomena which can be handled by BH judicial system 
                                                 
34
 The cohesion in the sense of politization of the administrative apparatus, which is over influenced by 
political sector, esp. in personal – cadres sense: which is conspicuously manifested in the process of 
appointment of administrative functionaries, nepotism and existence of the informal connections. 
35
 An Overview of Corruption in Central and Easter Europe, given by UNDP March 2002 provides 
following definition of the state capture phenomena: “State capture, in contrast, refers to the illicit actions 
of both private sector and public sector actors in actually shaping the “formation” of the basic rules of the 
game through the illicit and non-transparent provision of payments or other benefits to public officials. It 
describes activities on the part of enterprises and individuals to purchase preferential advantages directly 
from the state by subverting the formation of laws, rules, regulations and decrees. It includes not only the 
behavior of influential oligarchs who buy off legislators, but also the behavior of political leaders who 
shape the legal and regulatory framework to ensure their own private control over key resources. In each 
case, the state is captured to serve private interests and in each case, state capture encodes preferential 
advantages in the very rules of the game.” 
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4. state capture is present but the same is consequence of the war, and as such it 
shall vanish through programs of post-conflict stabilisation and transition of 
BH society 
5. this phenomena is progressing in BH 
6. this phenomena is decreasing in BH due to achieved institutional development 
of the legal-judicial system in the after war period of BH development 
7. this phenomenon is wide spread and represents great menace to BHs society 
 
16. Are you familiar with the concept of independent, specialised body for fight against 
corruption, with wide powers, primarily investigative ones? 
 
1. I am not familiar 
2. I have superficial knowledge of the concept 
3. this concept is more-less known to me 
4. I am well familiar with the concept and the examples of such bodies in other 
countries are well known to me 
5. I know this concept very well, both its lacks and advantages 
 
17. Considering all the objective and subjective indicators of the corruption in BH, do 
you feel BH needs a unique anti-corruption body as indicated in the former question? 
 
1. BH needs such a body: too big is the problem of corruption in the country 
2. not sure: I am sceptical about efficiency of such bodies 
3. BH is in position where it is not possible to realise basic parameters of the 
concept of anti-corruption body as provided in question 17th, in particularly its 
financial and political independence: 
 
a.) Yes 
b.) No 
 
4. BH is not in the need for such a body: the problem of corruption, esp. its 
gravest forms, is not serious enough in BH to require such an institutional 
response. 
 
18. Is there a political will in BH for the institutionalisation of strong anti-corruption 
body? 
 
1. I don’t think there is political will at all 
2. there is no enough of the political will 
3. the idea is good and it could be useful for BH, but it is not possible to reach 
overall political consensus about this issue 
4. I believe there is political will but the question itself was not researched and 
actualized enough 
5. undoubtedly there is political will for realisation of such a project 
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19. Do you consider that investigative branch of the planed Office for fight against 
corruption should be within SIPA, in the sense of necessity for preservation of the high 
standards of independence, specialisation and empowerment? 
 
1. Yes, that is a good solution 
2. No, that is not a good solution: the Office for fight against corruption must be 
completely independent and self handling in infrastructural, operative and 
political sense 
3. I am not sure because I don’t know what are possible consequences of that 
proposal 
 
20. What is the level of empowerment that officers of the unique anti-corruption body in 
BH    should have in your opinion? 
 
1. high level of empowerment: understands all investigative activities36  
2. as under no. 1. plus possibility for initiating prosecutive action 
3. middle level: common for police officers 
4. exclusively preventive roll and coordination of other institutions that deal with 
corruption 
 
21. How content are you with legislative anti-corruption framework in BH? 
  
1. little has been done: there is no enough of “friendly laws”37 
2. enough has been done but the legislative framework still has some week 
points 
3. situation is satisfying: legislative framework will be completely answered 
with the foreseen Law against corruption 
 
22. Do you think that anti-corruption body in BH should be empowered to undertake 
necessary investigative actions over all territory and on all administrative levels in BH? 
 
1. Yes, it should be empowered 
2. Yes, but only in cooperation with other entity and state organs 
3. No, something like that is not in the spirit of BH constitution 
 
23. When a unique anti-corruption body with wide spectra of powers in the form of 
agency or commission would be established in BH, which segment of State power should 
have control over such body? 
  
1. the commission of the Council of Ministers 
                                                 
36
 Right to access documents and question witnesses; usage of “friendly laws” (including criminalisation of 
“illegal enrichment”; special operative measures, unimpeded approach to required informations, public 
hearings conducted by the agency, insight to personal assets and incomes of high functionaries, freezing 
illegally obtained assets, seizure of passports, protection of informants, professional privileges etc. 
37
 It understands all the laws and regulations that are directly or indirectly related to corruption 
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2. agency or Commission that would directly answer to the President of the 
Council of Ministers 
3. Presidency of BH 
4. Parliamentary assembly 
 
24. Do you perceive administrative-political organisation and decentralisation of BH as 
an impediment in the way of realisation of the strong anti-corruption body in BH? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Maybe 
 
25. Do you think that already existing judicial-police institutions in BH are sufficient for 
successful fight against corruption? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
26. Do you think that judicial system in BH is reformed enough to be able to serve/follow 
the work of a specialized, independent and overall empowered unique body for fight 
against corruption in BH? 
  
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
27. Do you think that for successful diagnose of the corruption trends and designing 
preventive action at the state level, a unique body on the state level would suffice? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
28. In your opinion, should a central office for fight against corruption be dealing with: 
 
1. corruption on local level 
2. gravest forms of corruption 
3. all manifestations of corruption 
 
29. Do you believe that, at present, it is possible to secure complete independence of anti-
corruption body from the political interference in BH? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Remark: (here You can write down your remarks, observations or additional comments to 
any of these posed questions): 
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Questionnaire on the position of the delegates/representatives in the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to acceptable concept of anti-
corruption body in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
 
Respected, 
 
 
This questionnaire was designed to examine opinion of the members of a/m expert 
groups in respect to establishment of the unique body for fight against corruption in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where main purpose is to oppose corruption threat in as much 
successful manner. It is completely anonymous, which means that researcher is not 
interested for the identity of questioned person, nor shall the results be used to any other 
purpose but scientific one. The researcher is at the disposal of respondents for any 
informations related to this research. 
 
Please provide one answer – option per question! 
 
 
Thank You in advance for your cooperation! 
 
 
1. Respondents sex 
 
2. Year of birth_____________________________ 
3. Place of residence_________________________ 
4. Political party_____________________________ 
5. Nationality – ethnicity_______________________ 
 
6. Delegate/representative in: 
 
1. House of the people 
2. House of representatives 
 
 
7. How big, in your opinion, is the problem of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  
 
1. very big 
2. big 
3. average, no bigger than other problems 
4. small 
5. not a problem at all 
 
 8. Where, in your opinion, the corruption is most dispersed? 
 
1. in the administration 
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2. among politicians 
3. among medicine workers 
4. among university professors 
5. something else________________________________ 
 
9. Where do you think the opportunity for more successful fight against corruption should 
be sought? 
 
1. better financial means 
2. better cooperation with other institutions 
3. profesionalisation of the investigative officers 
4. dealing with the corruption on the state level 
5. development of specialised institutions 
6. something else_____________________________________________ 
 
 
10. Do you believe that corruption is more present in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in 
other countries? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. More – less as in other countries 
 
11. Do you think that corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rising or falling?  
 
1. it is rising 
2. it falls down 
3. corruption in BH is a permanent phenomena 
 
12. What is more relevant in the fight against corruption, regional initiatives or strong 
national programs? 
 
1. more significant are regional initiatives such as the one of the Stability Pact 
2. more significant are quality national programs 
3. their significance is of equal weight 
 
13. Are you content with what has been done so far in the field of anti-corruption fight at  
BHs national level? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
14. How do you estimate the relation between administrative and political sectors on 
different levels in BH, in the sense of possibilities that such connection opens for 
corruptive actions in BHs administrative-political system? 
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1. those are narrowly connected, but that fact is not relevant for corruption 
2. those are narrowly connected, which could be a negative factor 
3. narrowly connected, which opens wide space for corruptive actions 
4. medium connected, but they do not condition one another – in that sense there 
is no particular fear for corruption 
5. separate and completely independent – their relation is irrelevant for question 
of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
15. Do you deem that there is a negative cohesion38 of administrative and political sectors 
in BH as recidivism of the recent war? 
 
1. such cohesion does not exist 
2. it existed immediately after the war, now not any more 
3. it is still present to a certain measure 
4. there is strong connection between those two sectors 
5. there is strong connection between those two sectors and the same is direct 
result of the war 
 
16. Do you think that corruption would be lower in the after war period of BH 
development if there would had been lustration of the whole administrative - political 
system in BH? 
 
1. Yes – the corruption would be lower 
2. No – the corruption would not be lower 
3. If there would had been lustration process, the corruption problem now would 
be even bigger 
4. lustration has no influence to corruption 
 
17. Scientific literature dealing with issues of corruption knows the term “state 
capture”39. Do you think this phenomena is present in BH society and, if so, to what 
measure? 
 
1. State capture is not present in BH society 
2. it is present to a certain measure but it represent no serious problem 
                                                 
38
 The cohesion in the sense of politization of the administrative apparatus, which is over influenced by 
political sector, esp. in personal – cadres sense: which is conspicuously manifested in the process of 
appointment of administrative functionaries, nepotism and existence of the informal connections. 
39
 An Overview of Corruption in Central and Easter Europe, given by UNDP March 2002 provides 
following definition of the state capture phenomena: “State capture, in contrast, refers to the illicit actions 
of both private sector and public sector actors in actually shaping the “formation” of the basic rules of the 
game through the illicit and non-transparent provision of payments or other benefits to public officials. It 
describes activities on the part of enterprises and individuals to purchase preferential advantages directly 
from the state by subverting the formation of laws, rules, regulations and decrees. It includes not only the 
behavior of influential oligarchs who buy off legislators, but also the behavior of political leaders who 
shape the legal and regulatory framework to ensure their own private control over key resources. In each 
case, the state is captured to serve private interests and in each case, state capture encodes preferential 
advantages in the very rules of the game.” 
 
 58 
3. that is an occasional phenomena which can be handled by BH judicial system 
4. state capture is present but the same is consequence of the war, and as such it 
shall vanish through programs of post-conflict stabilisation and transition of BH 
society 
5. this phenomena is progressing in BH 
6. this phenomena is decreasing in BH due to achieved institutional development 
of the legal-judicial system in the after war period of BH development 
7. this phenomenon is wide spread and represents great menace to BHs society 
 
18. Are you familiar with the concept of independent, specialised body for fight against 
corruption, with wide powers, primarily investigative ones? 
 
1. I am not familiar 
2. I have superficial knowledge of the concept 
3. this concept is more-less known to me 
4. I am well familiar with the concept and the examples of such bodies in other 
countries are well known to me 
5. I know this concept very well, both its lacks and advantages 
 
19. Considering all the objective and subjective indicators of the corruption in BH, do 
you feel BH needs a unique anti-corruption body as indicated in the former question? 
 
1. BH needs such a body: too big is the problem of corruption in the country 
2. not sure: I am sceptical about efficiency of such bodies 
3. BH is in position where it is not possible to realise basic parameters of the 
concept of anti-corruption body as provided in question 17th, in particularly its 
financial and political independence: 
 
a.) Yes 
b.) No 
 
4. BH is not in the need for such a body: the problem of corruption, esp. its 
gravest forms, is not serious enough in BH to require such an institutional 
response. 
 
20. Is there a political will in BH for institutionalisation of strong anti-corruption body? 
 
1. I don’t think there is political will at all 
2. there is no enough of the political will 
3. the idea is good and it could be useful for BH, but it is not possible to reach 
overall political consensus about this issue 
4. I believe there is political will but the question itself was not researched and 
actualized enough 
5. undoubtedly there is political will for realisation of such a project 
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21. Do you consider that investigative branch of the planed Office for fight against   
corruption should be within SIPA, in the sense of necessity for preservation of the high 
standards of independence, specialisation and empowerment? 
 
1. Yes, that is a good solution 
2. No, that is not a good solution: the Office for fight against corruption must be 
completely independent and self handling in infrastructural, operative and 
political sense 
3. I am not sure because I don’t know what are possible consequences of that 
proposal 
 
22. What is the level of empowerment that officers of the unique anti-corruption body in 
 BH    should have in your opinion? 
 
1. high level of empowerment: understands all investigative activities40  
2. as under no. 1. plus possibility for initiating prosecutive action 
3. middle level: common for police officers 
4. exclusively preventive roll and coordination of other institutions that deal with 
corruption 
 
23. How content are you with legislative anti-corruption framework in BH? 
  
1. little has been done: there is no enough of “friendly laws”41 
2. enough has been done but the legislative framework still has some week points 
3. situation is satisfying: legislative framework will be completely answered with 
the foreseen Law against corruption 
 
24. Do you think that anti-corruption body in BH should be empowered to undertake 
necessary investigative actions over all territory and on all administrative levels in BH? 
 
1. Yes, it should be empowered 
2. Yes, but only in cooperation with other entity and state organs 
3. No, something like that is not in the spirit of BH constitution 
 
25. When a unique anti-corruption body with wide spectra of powers in the form of 
agency or commission would be established in BH, which segment of State power should 
have control over such body? 
  
1. the commission of the Council of Ministers 
2. agency or Commission that would directly answer to the President of the   
Council of Ministers 
                                                 
40
 Right to access documents and question witnesses; usage of “friendly laws” (including criminalisation of 
“illegal enrichment”; special operative measures, unimpeded approach to required informations, public 
hearings conducted by the agency, insight to personal assets and incomes of high functionaries, freezing 
illegally obtained assets, seizure of passports, protection of informants, professional privileges etc. 
41
 It understands all the laws and regulations that are directly or indirectly related to corruption 
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3. Presidency of BH 
4. Parliamentary assembly 
 
26. Do you perceive the administrative-political organisation and decentralisation of BH 
as an impediment in the way of realisation of the strong anti-corruption body in BH? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Maybe 
 
27. How big is the connection between here argued concept of anti-corruption body and 
question of protection of the vital national interests of BH constitutive peoples? 
 
1. very connected 
2. quite connected 
3. little connected 
4. there is no connection at all 
 
 
 
Remark: (here You can write down your remarks, observations or additional comments to 
any of here posed question): 
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